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. . . libro Aristotelis, qui Peri hermeneias dicitur, 
multis obscuritatibus involuto, inter multiplices 
occupationum mearum sollicitudines, expositionem 
adhibere curavi, hoc gerens in animo sic altiora pro 
posse perfectioribus exhibere, u t  tamen iunioribus 
proficiendi auxilia tradere non recusem. 
St. Thomas Aquinas, Epistola Nuncupatoria of 
the Commentary on Aristotle's Perihermena'as 
A slow but steady swing of a pendulum has been discernible during the sec- 
ond half of the twentieth century in an  old debate on  the nature of the Aristo- 
telian commentaries of St. Thomas Aquinas.1 In 1950, Jean Issac, O.P., wrote 
Leo Elders, Daniel Frank, Jorge Gracia, Mark Jordan, David O'Connor, 
Thomas O'Meara, 0 .  P., Robert Pasnau, and Paul Weithman were all most generous 
in reading and commenting on various versions of this article, and I am most 
grateful for their help. Versions were read at a colloquium of the Notre Dame 
philosophy department, at the 1994 meeting of the Midwestern Division of the 
American Philosophical Association, at the 1994 Summer Thomistic Institute at 
Notre Dame, and at a conference at the University of Fribourg (Suisse), and I have 
benefited from comments made by members of the audience on these occasions. 
Of course, opinions expressed herein are to be ascribed to me alone. 
1. cardinal ~ajet&, the first to provide a detailed commentary on one of 
Aquinas's works, addressed the problem in Angelici doctm's Sancti Thomm Aquinatis 
Summa Theologica in quinque tomos distn'buta: cum commtariis Thomae de Vio Cardinalis 
Cajetani; d elucidationibus literalibus f? Seraphini Capponi a Porrecta Ordinis Praedica- 
torum (Patavii: ex typographia Seminarii, 1698), IIa-IIae, 172, art. 4, commentaria 
Cardinalis Cajetani; and in subsequent centuries a succession of Thomistic scholars 
offered their opinions. Influential in shaping the twentieth-century debate were 
Pierre Mandonnet, O.P., in Siger de Brabant et L'AverroOme Latin au XIZm Si2cle 
(Louvain: Institut superieur de philosophe de 1'Universite 1911), pp. 39-42; and 
Martin Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geisteslebm: Abhandlungm sur Geschichte der Scho- 
lastik und Mystik (Munich: Hueber, 1926), pp. 266313. More recent contributions 
include Marie-Dominique Chenu, O.P., Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, trans. 
A.-M. Landry, O.P., and D. Hughes, O.P. (Chicago: Regnery, 1964), pp. 203-32; 
Georges Ducoin, S.J., "Saint Thomas Commentateur d'Aristote," RLchercMs de Phi- 
losophie1 (1955): 85-107; R. P. Ioannes Issac, O.P., "Saint Thomas Interprete Des 
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that in the Aristotelian commentaries Aquinas expresses his own philosophi-
cal views, just as the Summa theologiaeputs forth his theology.2 In this appropήa-
tionist reading (as I shall call it), what Aquinas presents in the commentaries
are his own views, albeit only philosophical ones which do not rely on Chris-
tian revelation. Etienne Gilson countered and claimed that Aquinas's "com-
mentaries on Aristotle are so many expositions of the doctrine of Aristotle,
not of what might be called his own philosophy."3 And more recently Mark
Jordan argued that these works are of the genre of a literal commentary, and
such a commentary "does not assert that the text under explication is true. It
asserts only that the text merits careful reading."4 In this histoήcistreading (as
I shall call it), Aquinas intends only to offer an exegesis of Aristotle's writings,
not to present his own views on the matters under discussion.
In what follows I shall argue that Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle
were guided by sophisticated hermeneutical principles missed by both the
appropriationist and the historicist. However, Aquinas gives no extended
discussions of the principles which guided his commentaries on Aristotle, as
he did for the interpretation of scripture and Christian patristic writers.5
Aside from brief and general remarks, such as the epigraph above, it is only
Oeuvres D'Aristote," in Scholastica Ratione Historico-Critica Instauranda (Rome: Bib-
liotheca Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani, 1951), pp. 353-63; Etienne Gilson, whose
remarks are brief but influential, in History of Chήstian Philosophy in the Middle Ages
(London: Sheed & Ward, 1955), p. 367, and in Elements of Chήstian Philosophy
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), p. 282; James A. Weisheipl, O.R, Friar Thomas
D'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), pp.
272-285; Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," in St.
Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, 1974), pp. 213-38; Rene Antoine Gauthier, O.P., "Saint Thomas
et LΈthique a Nicomaque," in Sentencia libή politicorum. Tabula Him ethicorum, Leo-
nine Edition of Thomas's Opera Omnia 48 (Rome, 1882-), i-xxv; and the preface to
Sentencia UbriDe anima in Opera Omnia 45, pp. 293*-88*; Ludwig Hόdl, "Philosophis-
che Ethik und Moral-Theologie in der Summa fratris Thomae," in Thomas von Aquin
(Berlin: Zimmermann, 1988), pp. 23-42; Mark D. Jordan, "Thomas Aquinas's
Disclaimers in the Aristotelian Commentaries," in Philosophy and the God of Abraham:
Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, O.R, ed. R. James Long (Toronto: Pontifical
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991), p. 104, and in The Alleged Aήstotelianism of
Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson Series 15 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, 1992); Francis Cheneval and Ruedi Imbach, in the einleitung to Prologe zu
den Aήstoteleskommentaren (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1993), pp. xiii-lx.
2. Issac, "Saint Thomas," p. 355. Although others may not have asserted this
view as starkly as Issac, it is not uncommon to find in the literature writers citing,
without futher comment, passages in the Aristotelian commentaries when they are
trying to discover Aquinas's own views on some philosophical issue. Such a proce-
dure implicitly endorses Issac's position.
3. Gilson, History of Chήstian Philosophy, p. 367.
4. Jordan, "Thomas Aquinas's Disclaimers," p. 104.
5. For a discussion of the principles which guided scriptural interpretation, see,
for example, Summa theologiae 1.1.9 and 10 and the preface to the commentary on
the Book of Job. For those that guide his reading of patristic writers, see the preface
to Contra Errores Graecorum. Hereafter the Summa theologiae will be referred to as ST.
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from a careful study of his texts that we can infer the best account of these
commentaries. My strategy here shall be, first, to argue that the now domi-
nant historicist reading cannot explain certain passages in which Aquinas's
views clearly intrude in his commentaries, and for this I shall offer repre-
sentative examples of three kinds of such passages. Second, I shall contend
that if we take seriously Aquinas's dialectical treatment of authorities, and of
what determines the meaning of an author's words and the content of his or
her thoughts, we can see that for Aquinas the interpretation of Aristotle's
texts would have not only allowed but also required the interpreter to bring
to bear his or her own views on the truth of the issue under consideration.
Although not wholly uncontroversial, the following theses constitute a com-
mon view about the nature and circumstances of composition of Aquinas's
Aristotelian commentaries.6 First, Aquinas wrote the commentaries for peda-
gogical purposes, and the intended audience was students in the arts, whose
course of studies would have been focused primarily on the works of Aris-
totle.7 Second, Aquinas wanted to help his students understand Aristotle's
thought as it is expressed in his texts, not to present own. As he often writes in
the commentaries, Aquinas's concern is with understanding the "words" or
the "intention" or the "mind" of Aristotle, and therefore he was not inter-
ested in passing judgment on Aristotle's claims or in constructing his own
account of the matter. Third, he was concerned that in those places where
6. Very prominent dissenters from the following account include Gauthier and
others who endorse his fundamental claims, such as Hόdl, Cheneval, and Imbach.
Gauthier claims that as a theologian Aquinas saw his tasks as those of a sage, to
proclaim truth and refute error. In Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries he at-
tempts to refute certain perennial theological and philosophical opinions thought
to be in conflict with Christian revelation. Thus, in De anima commentary, he
attempts to refute the materialism of the pre-Socratics and the idealism of Plato and
to extract from Aristotle's texts a philosophical account of the soul, valid for all
times, which could give the Christian a better understanding of the truth about
human beings, as this is revealed by the word of God. Due to limitations of space, I
will not discuss Gauthier's understanding of Aquinas's commentaries here but
confine myself to another reading. Nevertheless, I believe that Gauthier's position
is extremely important and interesting and that my central claims here can enable
us to understand Aquinas's project in the commentaries even if we adopt his
approach. An explanation of how this is so, however, will have to await another
occasion.
7. As a 1255 decree of the University of Paris makes clear, the texts lectured on
and studied in the Arts Faculty of Paris were the known works of Aristotle, some
works falsely attributed to Aristotle, and a handful of other works; Chartulaήum
universitatis Paήsiensis, ed. Henricus Denifle, O.P. (Paris: Parisiis: ex typis fratrum
Delalain 1889), vol. 1, pp. 277-79. The education in Dominican houses of study
seems to have followed closely that at Paris (pp. 385-86).
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Aristotle's works were in conflict with orthodox Christian doctrine, or at least
thought to be so, his students would not be led to take up heretical opinions.
This concern would, of course, have been heightened by the Latin Averroist
controversies at Paris from the mid-1260s until the mid-1270s.8
These theses give us a historicist reading, with a minor twist: Aquinas
wrote the commentaries to help students understand Aristotle's writings,
but he brought in Christian doctrine where Aristotle's texts were in conflict
with, or thought to be in conflict with, orthodox doctrine. If these assump-
tions are correct, we would expect Aquinas to do several things in the
commentaries: (1) for the most part, he would, prescinding from any
judgments on the truth of Aristotle's claims, simply help the reader under-
stand Aristotle by providing as exegetically careful and accurate a commen-
tary as he could; (2) he would, however, try to protect the reader from
heterodoxy by noting where Aristotle's views are in conflict with orthodox
doctrine; and (3) he would show the reader that where Aristotle's argu-
ments were in conflict with the faith, they were not valid and sound dem-
onstrations with necessary conclusions, and thereby show that correct
philosophical reasoning does not conflict with divinely revealed doctrine.9
To a great degree, these expectations are fulfilled.10
In certain passages, however, Aquinas's own theological and philo-
sophical views intrude in places and in ways fundamentally discordant with
the essentially historicist reading just recounted. What follows is not an
8. Weisheipl claims that Aquinas undertook the writing of the commentaries in
response to the controversy over Latin Averroism at the University of Paris. Aquinas
wrote them, Weisheipl contends, to keep students from Averroistic heresy while
they attempted to understand Aristotle's works. Gauthier and Jordan argue that this
could not have been his initial motivation for writing, for the first commentary, on
De anima, was written between December 1267 and September 1268 at Santa Sabina
in Rome, before he returned to Paris and entered the Averroistic fray (Gauthier,
preface to Sentencia Him De anima, pp. 283*-94*; Jordan, "St. Thomas's Disclaimers",
p. 105). Still, even if we grant Gauthier's and Jordan's point, because Aquinas wrote
the commentaries not for his peers but for students, he naturally would have paid
special attention to those places where Aristotle's doctrine seemed to conflict with
Christian doctrine and take care that his students would not have been led to
heretical views. When we turn to the relevant passages in the commentaries, we do
find evidence of this concern.
9. As Aquinas writes, "If the adversary believes none of that which has been
divinely revealed, there is no way to prove the articles of faith through arguments,
but only to refute arguments against faith, should he bring any forward. Since faith
is founded on infallible truth and it is impossible that something contrary to truth
be demonstrated, it is clear that the proofs brought forward against faith are not
demonstrations, but refutable arguments" (ST 1.1.8). This and all other translations
of Aquinas are mine.
10. A good example of a passage in which Aquinas pursues these goals is found
in In octo libros physicorum Aήstotelis expositio 8.2.986 (hereafter In physica). There
Aquinas presents a careful exegesis of the text and shows where Aristotle's claims
do and do not conflict with faith. (Aquinas writes, "And one part of this, namely,
that motio always was, is incompatible with our faith. . . . But another part is not
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exhaustive list but representative examples of three sorts of passages which
are problematic for the established account.
Suggestive Glosses
In the famous passages in Nicomachean Ethics 10.7 and 8, Aristotle argues that
a life of contemplation is the highest happiness for a human, although a life
of moral virtue according to practical wisdom is happy in a secondary way:
Hence it is clear that both the moral virtues and prudence are about
composites. The composite virtues, properly speaking, are human inso-
far as a human being is a composite of soul and body. Thus also a life
which is according to these (viz., according to prudence and moral
virtue) is a human life, which is to say an active life. And consequently
the happiness which consists in living this life is human. But the con-
templative life and happiness, which is proper to the intellect, is sepa-
rate and divine.11
In one reading this gloss is a straightforward summary of some of Aristotle's
key claims in these chapters. Aristotle, as Aquinas recognizes, is contrasting
two kinds of happiness that one may achieve on earth.12 The first consists
in living a life in accordance with the moral virtues and practical wisdom;
the second consists in living a contemplative life, one whose happiness is
the excellence of the activity of the intellect. The latter sort of happiness,
the excellence of reason, Aristotle writes, "is a thing apart [κeχωpισμέvη in
Aristotle's text; separata in Aquinas's translation],"13 for it is the excellence
wholly contrary to faith.. . . We hold by faith that at some time the substance of the
world began to be, but, on the other hand, it would never cease to be.") Aquinas
contends that insofar as Aristotle's arguments are successful, they do not under-
mine Christian faith. ("If anyone rightly examines the arguments here presented,
the truth of faith cannot be efficaciously assailed by such arguments.") In the course
of this lectio he adamantly rejects Averroes's interpretation of Aristotle. This and
similar passages are strikingly consonant with WeisheipΓs views. See, for example,
In duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aήstotelis expositio 7.5.2495-99 (hereafter In meta.);
In decent libros ethicorum Aήstotelis ad Nicomachum expositio 1.9.113-17 (hereafter In
ethica); In Aήstotelis librum de anima commentaήum 3.9.726 (hereafter In de animά); In
libros Aήstotelis de caelo et mundo 1.4.64-66 (hereafter In de caelo). The numbers in all
references to the Aristotelain commentaries are to the book, lectio, and paragraph
number in the Marietti editions.
11. In ethica 10.12.2115.
12. Aquinas writes, "Me qui vacat speculationi veήtati, est maxime felix, quantum
homo in hac vita felix esse potest" {In ethica 10.11.2110).
13. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, H78a22 trans. W. D. Ross, rev. J. O.
Urmson, in The Complete Works of Aήstotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Bollingen Series
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Unviversity Press, 1985), vol. II.
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of the activity not of the composite of intellect and body but of the intellect
alone. Hence, it is not a human happiness, the excellence of the activity of
the whole human person, but is something apart or separate. And it is
divine because its activity is most akin to [σiη^eveστάτη; cognatissima]14 or
some likeness of [όμoίωμα; similitudo]15 the activity of God, which is con-
templation.16
For Aquinas's Christian audience, however, these words would have
suggested something more, and Aquinas's glosses encourage this further
suggestion. For them the life of perfect contemplation is a thing apart also
in the sense that it is enjoyed after one's earthly life, when one beholds the
divine essence and knows other things through beholding the divine es-
sence.
17
 This activity of the intellect is separate or apart in the further sense
that the intellect is actually separated from its earthly body, and one lives a
life apart from earthly life. Aquinas encourages this suggestion when, im-
mediately after the passage quoted above, he writes, "To learn this much
about this matter at present is sufficient, for whatever else which can be
made known with certainty is beyond what pertains to the proposition at
hand. [Aristotle] treats this in the third book of the De anima, where he
shows that the intellect is separate."18 According to Aquinas's under-
standing of the third book of De anima, Aristotle argues that the intellect is
separate in the sense of being separable from the body and is destined for
an immortal life after the death of the body.19
The term 'divine' (divinus) would also suggest more to Aquinas's read-
ers than seems clearly expressed in the text at hand. In one place Aquinas
glosses Aristotle's claims by saying that the intellect is something divine in us,
and he adds, "plainly, a human participates with respect to his intellect in a
divine similitude."20 Aquinas's readers would have been reminded of his
understanding of the doctrine in the book of Genesis that humans are made
in the image and likeness of God.21 Moreover, since he is here speaking about
perfect happiness or beatitude, his comment would have suggested the scrip-
tural claim that when we behold the divine essence in heaven, "we will be like
[God], for we will see him as he is" (1 John. 3:2). Aquinas understands this
state as the perfection of our assimilation to God.22
Although Aquinas does not explicitly attribute these Christian under-
standings to Aristotle's words in Nicomachean Ethics 10.7 and 8, he does not
14. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10.8 1178b24, Il79a26.
15. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10.8 1178b25.
16. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10.8 1178b21-22.
17. ST 1.12.6-13.
18. Inethica 10.12.2116.
19. In de anima 3.10.742-43.
20. Inethica 10.11.2106.
21. "Manifestum est autem quod in homine invenitur aliqua Dei similitudo, quae
deducitur a Deo sicut ab exemplaή. . . . Et ideo in homine dicitur esse imago Deo, non tamen
perfecta, sed imperfecta " (ST 1.93.1).
22. ST 1.93.4.
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discourage their suggestion, and in some places his comments encourage
them. This is difficult to understand on a historicist reading. If he is trying
to understand and help his readers understand Aristotle's views, it seems
that he should be as interested in making the differences between Aristotle
and a Christian view known as he is in making similarities known. It would
count against neither Aristotle nor Christian doctrine to admit that a pagan
philosopher did not fully grasp what could be known through Christian
revelation about perfect beatitude for humans, and it would discourage the
overly zealous Aristotelianism of some Averroists. But Aquinas seems inter-
ested in encouraging suggestions of a Christian understanding of Aristotle's
claims, not in marking differences.
Ambiguous Glosses
In Metaphysics 12.9.1 174M5-34, Aristotle considers the nature of divine
thought. He begins with puzzles. Does divine thought have an object or not?
Is its substance the faculty of thought or the act of thinking? If it has an
object, does it think of itself or of something else? And if something else,
the same thing always or something different? Does it matter whether it
thinks of the good or any chance thing? Aristotle then briefly argues that
the divine thought is of that which is most divine and precious, which is
God, and it is changeless, for its substance is the act of thinking. He
concludes:, "Therefore it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks
(since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on
thinking."23
Aristotle's theology appears at odds with a Christian view. When he
states, "Either [the divine being] thinks of itself or of something else," he
clearly seems to imply that one but not both of the alternatives is true.24 In
adopting the former alternative, that God's thinking is of his own thinking,
Aristotle rejects the latter. But this sharply contrasts with Christian theology,
according to which God not only knows but also providentially orders and
guides His creation.
In his lectio on this text, Aquinas sets forth Aristotle's arguments and
claims clearly and follows the text closely. After stating Aristotle's conclu-
sions, he writes,
We should also consider that the Philosopher intends to show that God
does not understand another but himself, insofar as the thing under-
stood is the perfection of the one understanding, and of the one who
is to understand. And it is evident that nothing else can be understood
23. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1074b33-34.
24. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1074b22. Aquinas's own translation of this line
uses the disjunction aut rather than vel. The former, but not the latter, tends to
imply that only one of the disjuncts is true.
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by God in such a way that it is the perfection of his intellect. Neverthe-
less it does not follow that all other things are unknown to him: for in
understanding himself he understands all other things.25
Aquinas then justifies the final sentence in the above comment by arguing
that the First Mover understands Himself perfectly, and "the more perfectly
some principle is known, the more perfectly is its effect known in it."26
Because "the heaven and all of nature" depend on God, it is clear that "God,
in knowing himself, knows all things."27 Aquinas concludes by countering a
possible objection that God's knowledge of things other than himself deni-
grates his dignity.28
This gloss is ambiguous. On one reading, Aquinas intends to set forth
not only what Aristotle explicitly claims but also what Aquinas recognized,
and expected his readers to recognize, followed from Aristotle's claims. But
if this is so, Aquinas's reading is clearly tendentious. He adopts an interpre-
tation which goes beyond and even conflicts with Aristotle's texts, one
which is shaped by Aquinas's own views. Such a reading is clearly at odds
with a historicist account of the commentaries.
A second possibility is that Aquinas intends, after presenting Aristotle's
views, to tell the reader what does or does not follow from the philosopher's
claims, even though Aristotle did not recognize these consequences. Such a
practice is understandable, a historicist may argue, because this is an issue on
which Aristotle's claims seem to be in conflict with orthodox doctrine, and
Aquinas would wish to show that there is no genuine conflict between the
truths of revelation and the conclusions of natural reason. But even in this
reading, which is more innocuous for the historicist, it is hard to understand
why Aquinas left the text ambiguous and did not acknowledge the differ-
ences between Aristotelian and Christian doctrine, as he does elsewhere.29
Tendentious Glosses
In Metaphysics 2.1.993b23-30 we find the following passage:
A thing has a quality in a higher degree than other things if in virtue
of it the similar quality belongs to the other things as well (e.g., fire is
the hottest of things; for it is the cause of the heat of all other things)
so that that which causes derivative truths to be true is most true. Hence
the principles of eternal things must always be most true (for they are
not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but
2b.Inmeta. 12.11.2614.
26.1nmeta. 12.11 2615.
27. In meta. 12.11 2615.
28. Inrneta. 12.112616.
29. See n. 10 above.
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they themselves are the cause of the being of other things), so that as
each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth.
Aristotle's argument begins from this principle: if x is the cause of F in y,
then x is more F than y. He applies this to the causes of truth: if x is the cause
of the truth of y, then xis more true than y. He concludes that the principles
of eternal things are most true, for (1) they are always true, and (2) they
are the cause of being (and hence truth) of other things, though they have
no cause of their being (and truth).
A key phrase in this compact and obscure passage is "cause of being"
(αίτiov τoΰ εfvαi; causa ut sint). Aristotelian commentators generally read
the passage in the light of Metaphysics 12 and the "eternal things" to be the
celestial spheres, the celestial bodies they carry and their attributes, and the
"principles of eternal things" to be the separate substances which corre-
spond to each sphere. There is no hint there of any doctrine of creation ex
nihilo.so Rather, the separate substances are principles of the spheres in that
they move them as final causes. Thus the separate substances are "causes of
being," not in the sense that they are causes of the being of the celestial
spheres and bodies themselves, but in the sense that they are principles of
the eternal motion of these eternal spheres, which they bring about as final
causes.
Aquinas reads the Metaphysics 2.1 passage otherwise. His comment is
for the most part clear, straightforward, and well grounded in the text. But
near the end, regarding the reasons why the principles of eternal things are
most true, he writes,
These principles have no cause but are the cause of the being of other
things. And because of this they transcend the celestial bodies in truth
and being: although [the celestial bodies] are incorruptible, neverthe-
less they have a cause not only of their movement, as some have
thought, but also with respect to their being, as the Philosopher here
expressly says.31
Aquinas believes that Aristotle is claiming that the separate substances are
causes of the being of the spheres, not only of their motion. Aquinas finds
in this text a doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Having found such a doctrine
expressed here, Aquinas goes on to interpret other lengthier passages, such
as Physics 8, in light of it.32
30. Aristotle insists in the strongest terms that motion, and hence substances,
are eternal {Metaphysics 12.6, 107lb6-7); and he gives no indication that he feels
there is a need for a cause or principle of their existence.
31. Inmeta. 2.2.295.
32. See especially Inphysica 8.2.974. Aquinas attributes to Aristotle a notion of
creation ex nihilo but a creation that was from eternity and not in time. Such a
notion of creation was not wholly foreign to Christian thought. Boethius endorses
it and attributes it to Plato; Philosophiae consolationis (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1960),
lb. 5, pr. 6, 109-10.
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If we isolate the passage in Metaphysics 2.1, Aquinas's reading of "prin-
ciples of eternal things" and "cause of being" is possible. Taking the whole
corpus into account, however, the evidence from other Aristotelian texts is
too slender to suppose he held a full-blown doctrine of creation ex nihilo.
The interpretation which Aquinas explicitly rejects, that the First Mover is
the cause of the motion and not the existence of eternal things, seems
clearly preferable. Aquinas's reading of Aristotle seems biased by his Chris-
tian doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Since Aquinas was not generally a careless
reader of Aristotle's texts, his comments on these passages are difficult to
understand in a historicist account of his intentions.
Although large portions of the commentaries consist of careful and
commendable exegeses with occasional comment and elaboration, as the
historicist would expect, there are places where Aquinas's own views seem
to shape his comment on and interpretation of Aristotle's text, as the
appropriationist might expect. Thus some have been inclined to think that
the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Marie-Dominique Chenu, O.P.
claimed that while Aquinas showed great concern with the literal meaning
of Aristotle's text, he engaged in "reverential exegesis" in which "the prin-
ciples and the first steps toward truth included in the text will be brought,
so to speak, to their ripening."3 3 Chenu quoted Cajetan: 'Very often, [St.
Thomas] glosses Aristotle as Philosopher, not as Aristotle as such; and thus,
in favor of truth." 3 4 But how, in Aquinas's own understanding of his project,
do the exegetical and constructive elements fit together, and what sort of
work results? If Aquinas intended exegesis of Aristotle but allowed his own
views to intrude, it would seem that he did was bad exegesis. If, on the other
hand, he intended to construct and present his own views and yet did so in
the context of what appears to be a literal exegesis of Aristotle, it would
seem that he knowingly confused the reader.
What is needed is an account of how the exegetical and constructive
elements fit together in a coherent understanding of these works. In the
next section I shall try to identify the hermeneutical principles behind
Aquinas's procedure and the factors which gave rise to these principles.
II
Aristotle was for Aquinas and his contemporaries not simply an ancient
philosopher but also an authority (auctoήtas). For them the writings of an
authority were not texts to be simply learned and parroted; they were,
rather, aids in one's inquiries into truth. Dialectical reasoning provided a
33. Chenu, Understanding Saint Thomas, p. 207. See also Ducoin, "Saint
Thomas," who takes a similar position.
34. Chenu, Understanding Saint Thomas, p. 207.
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method by which authoritative claims could be used in one's inquiries. In
this section I shall first consider the dialectical treatment of authorities,
highlighting certain aspects that, I shall argue, influenced Aquinas's com-
mentaries on Aristotle. Central to this sort of treatment is a distinction
between an author's understanding of a key word or phrase and a fuller,
more adequate account which the author may have only vaguely expressed
or even imperfectly recognized. Subsequently, I shall consider aspects of
Aquinas's views on linguistic meaning and mental states which further
clarified and justified this distinction. We can then begin to discern the
hermeneutical principles which guided Aquinas's commentaries on
Aristotle.
Authorities and Dialectic
In the twelfth century Peter Abelard wrote Sic et Non, a juxtaposition of
divergent claims of authorities on 158 theological issues. Although collec-
tions of the sayings of authorities were not uncommon before Abelard, his
work is distinguished by its systematic character and logical perspicuity.
Abelard's 158 questions are divided into three parts, which together cover
the range of issues in Christian theology.35 Each question arises from a point
on which there are apparently divergent authoritative opinions, and the
opposition among them is rather starkly presented.36
Although some have suggested that Abelard contrived surreptitiously
to undermine accepted authorities, the prologue to the work suggests that
his intention was the opposite. He hoped the collection of sayings "would
stimulate young readers to the greatest effort in inquiring into truth" for
"through doubting we come to inquiry; through inquiring we learn the
truth."37 Faced with an apparent conflict between authorities, Abelard
makes clear that one's first tactic should be to attempt to reconcile the
authorities by showing that the conflict is merely apparent.38 He offers in
the prologue several strategies by which the dicta of authorities might be
reconciled and conflict eliminated. Central to most of these is close atten-
tion to the signification of terms and to the context of statements.
35. The first part (qq. 1-105) concerns faith, God, divine power and provi-
dence, angels, the fall, redemption, and Christology. The second part (qq. 106-35)
concerns the sacraments. The third part (qq. 136-58) concerns Christian ethics.
36. On how Abelard's work is traditional and how innovative, see Jean Jolivet,
Arts du Langage et Theologie chez Abelard, Etudes de Philosophic Medievale Series
(Paris: Vrin, 1982), especially pp. 238-51.
37. Peter Abelard, Sic et Non: A Cήtical Edition, ed. Blanche B. Boyer and
Richard McKeon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976-77), p. 103.
38. Abelard recognizes that reconciliation will not always be possible and
recommends that in such a case, 'The authorities are to be brought together and
the one of stronger testimony and better confirmed is to be held as preeminent (Sic
etNon,p. 96)."
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We find here what we can label, somewhat loosely, an Abelardian
approach to the dialectical treatment of authorities. Among the important
features of this treatment are (1) an identification of issues on which
divergent authoritative opinions exist, which issues in turn become ques-
tions for the inquirer; (2) an assumption that authoritative opinions carry
weight in deciding a question, although this may not be absolute;39 thus (3)
an assumption that for any question a resolution is to be preferred ceteris
paήbus if it can be harmonized with authoritative sayings; and (4) strategies
for reconciling resolutions to questions with authoritative sayings which
emphasize the signification of words and the context of statements. It was
by following such a procedure, Abelard believed, that beginning from
doubt one could engage in a fruitful inquiry that leads to truth.
Abelard's approach was carried into thirteenth-century universities by
Peter Lombard's Four Books of Sentences, which was to become the standard
text for theological instruction, and by the institutionalization of the dis-
puted question.40 As both a student and master, Aquinas was thoroughly
imbued with this dialectical approach to accepted authorities in a disci-
pline. He was trained in disputations as a student, and as a master con-
ducted numerous disputations. When he came to write the Summa theologiae,
although he was willing to be innovative in many respects, he adopted the
structure of a disputed question in each article.
Aquinas, then, stands firmly in the Abelardian tradition of a dialectical
approach to authorities. He differs, however, in that respect in which the
whole of the thirteenth century is distinguished from earlier scholars in the
Latin West: he had access to and studied carefully the whole Aristotelian
corpus. Abelard, Peter Lombard, and their twelfth-century contemporaries
knew only some of Aristotle's logical works. They had the Topics and Sophis-
tical Refutations, which are important works on dialectic, but they could not
see how dialectic played a role in Aristotle's own philosophical investiga-
tions. Moreover, the study of dialectic after Boethius had moved away from
the genuine dialectical context presupposed by Aristotle's Topics and toward
a focus on abstract principles, which would enable one to find the middle
term for syllogisms. In this respect, it was more Boethian than Aristotelian.41
Thus, although Aquinas was heir to the Abelardian tradition, his ap-
proach to discordant authoritative voices was enriched and further speci-
fied by his study of Aristotle. Abelard recommended reconciling authorities
by showing that the disagreement was merely apparent. Aristotle suggested
39. As Aquinas makes clear in ST 1.1.8, ad 2, different sorts of authorities vary
in the weight their statements carry in a discipline.
40. On this see Weisheipl, Thomas D'Aquino, pp. 124ff.; and Gorden Leff, Pans
and Oxford in the 13th and 14th Centuήes: An Institutional and Intellectual History (New
York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 167-77.
41. For a discussion of the differences between early medieval and Aristotelian
dialectic, see Eleonore Stump, Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval
Logic (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), especially chaps. 1-5.
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more subtle ways in which established opinions, though in one way actually
discordant, might be harmonized in some higher synthesis.
In Topics, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of examining the
number of meanings a term may have for the sake of (1) clarity, (2)
ensuring that our reasoning is addressed to the facts and not merely to
verbal disagreements, and (3) avoiding being misled by false reasoning.42
Moreover, he says, we must not only note differences of senses but also try
to render definitions of terms, and thus see how different senses of a term
are related to one another:
We must not only treat of those terms which bear different senses, but
we must also try to render their definitions; e.g., we must not merely
say that justice and courage are called 'good' in one sense, and that
what conduces to vigor and what conduces to health are called so in
another, but also that the forms are so called because of a certain
intrinsic quality they have, the latter because they are productive of a
certain result and not because of any intrinsic quality in themselves.
Similarly also in other cases.43
Aristotle goes on to give an elaborate set of tests for determining similarity
and difference of meaning.
In Aristotle's own scientific inquiries the attention to similarities and
differences of sense is central. When faced with a conceptual question,44
Aristotle begins, in accord with the proper dialectical method outlined in
Topics,45 by considering the various εvδόξα (i.e., common or reputable
opinions) on the matter. Each of these is shown, as it stands, to be unable
to account for certain difficulties. A critical step in the procedure is to
recognize some possible equivocation in each of the έvδόξα and to go on
and differentiate the various senses of the key term or terms. Aristotle is
able to give a full answer to the question when he has identified a certain
sense of a key term as "unqualified" (άπλώς), "primary" (πpώcov), or "strict"
(Kυpίως). Finally, although each of the εvδόξα is then shown to have gone
wrong because it failed to grasp the fully adequate sense of the term,
nevertheless each is shown to have partially grasped the solution and thus
42. Aristotle Topics 1.18, 108al8-35.
43. Topics 1.15, 106a2-8, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, in The Complete Works
ofAήstotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Bolingen Series (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1985), vol. I.
44.1 do not wish to suggest that there is a sharp distinction between empirical
and conceptual questions in Aristotle. Yet as G. E. L. Owen has pointed out in
"Tithenai ta Phainomena," in Articles on Aήstotle: 1. Science, ed. Jonathan Barnes,
Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1975), pp. 113-18,
in some of Aristotle's enquiries the phainomena seem to be straightforward empirical
observations, whereas in others they are common or reputable opinions. It is the
latter cases, which are not based immediately on a specific set of observations, which
I am calling, rather loosely, "conceptual."
45. See Aristotle Topics 8.5.
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is accommodated in the final, full answer. In this way, Aristotle believes, his
solution "saves the phenomena.'*46
Consider, for example, Aristotle's discussion of the question of "how a
man who judges rightly can behave incontinently."47 He begins by citing Soc-
rates's view that incontinence is impossible, that "no one . . . when he judges
acts against what he judges best—people act so only by reason of igno-
rance."
48
 This position, Aristotle notes, is opposed to the phenomenon that
people regularly behave incontinently. After listing some further puzzles,
Aristotle identifies some possible equivocations in key terms and makes some
crucial distinctions. First, with respect to kinds of knowledge, knowledge may
either be of a universal premise or of a particular premise in a practical syllo-
gism. Second, with respect to ways in which something may be known, a per-
son may have knowledge in the sense of actually using it or one may have it
and not be using it; the knowledge is then merely dispositional. With these
distinctions, Aristotle is in a position to offer his own analysis of inconti-
nence. The incontinent person is aware of two universal premises, such as
(1) Sweet things ought not to be tasted.
(2) Tasting sweet things is pleasant.
He is also aware of a particular proposition, such as
(3) This is sweet.
Driven by a strong appetite for pleasure, the incontinent person is led to
subsume (3) under (2), and consequently he eats the cake. Thus (1),
though he has knowledge of it, remains dormant. Aristotle then concludes
the discussion by remarking that "the position Socrates sought to establish
actually seems to result."49 Although Aristotle, unlike Socrates, recognizes
the possibility of incontinence, his account is such that the incontinent
person does not act against what he actually judges best but rather his
knowledge of a universal premise remains merely dispositional and does
not come into play in this practical syllogism. Although Aristotle disagrees
with the Socratic position about the possibility of incontinence, he believes
he is able to accommodate Socrates's central insight in his solution.
Aristotle's dialectical procedure in scientific inquiry, then, involves (1)
a sensitivity to equivocation in key terms in competing answers to some
46. My description of Aristotle's method follows closely that of Michael Fere-
john, The Origins of Aήstotelian Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1991), pp. 54-55. See also J. D. G. Evans, Aήstotle's Concept of Dialectic (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977), especially chap. 3; and Owen, "Tithenai ta
Phainomena."
47. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 7.2, 1145b22-23.
48. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 7.2, 1145b27-28.
49. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 7.3, 1147bl5-16.
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difficulty; (2) recognition that the solution lies in some more adequate
grasp of the sense of certain key terms; (3) a presumption that the less than
adequate opinions nevertheless have some partial insight into the full
answer; and (4) an attempt to show that the partial insight of other answers
is included in, though superseded by, that of the full answer. Such a proce-
dure helps bring conviction on the part of disputants, for they see how they
have grasped the truth, albeit partially.
Translated into the thirteenth-century context of the disputed ques-
tion, the Aristotelian strategy becomes a powerful and widely applicable
procedure for dealing with conflicting authoritative claims. A survey of
Aquinas's responses to objections from authoritative sayings shows it is one
which he employs ubiquitously.50
We find in Aquinas, then, a fruitful fusion of two traditions. On the one
hand, he inherited the Christian, Abelardian tradition, which founds in-
quiry within a discipline on authorities, identifies questions where there is
an apparent conflict between authoritative claims, and seeks resolution by
harmonizing authorities. On the other hand, Aquinas adopted and adapted
the Aristotelian tradition of dialectical inquiry beginning from έvδόξα,
which emphasizes attention to the possible equivocality of key terms in
competing opinions and seeks an adequate understanding of key notions
which will resolve difficulties and enable one to understand έvδόξα as
partial or perhaps vague anticipations of the wholly adequate account.
One feature of Aquinas's Aristotelian approach is particularly important
for our concerns. In some cases, reconciliation of a position with an authori-
tative saying may require finding a sense of the words of a writer or speaker
which he or she did not fully realize. In reconciling his own account of incon-
tinence with Socrates's view, Aristotle claims that the incontinent man does
not act against his knowledge because the relevant piece of knowledge is uni-
versal, whereas practical judgment is of particulars, and it remains merely dis-
positional in this case. But these are distinctions which Socrates did not make
with respect to his claim. Thus, the harmonization of Aristotle's analysis with
Socrates's claim requires that we attribute to Socrates's words an under-
standing which Socrates did not share and this implies some distinction be-
50. In a survey of the first five questions of parts 1, 1-2, and 3 of the Summa
theologίae, I found thirty-nine objections in which a nonscriptural authority is cited
and convincingly read as opposing the position Aquinas adopts (I discounted (1)
scriptural citations, for these are complicated by the great number of possible
senses of a divinely revealed text; (2) obviously sophistical arguments, which are
based on a clear misconstrual of an authoritative statement, which Aquinas dis-
misses summarily; and (3) cases in which the authority is cited only to support a
premise of a contrary argument but does not explicitly oppose Aquinas's position.)
In all of his responses we find the elements of an Aristotelian approach: he points
out a possible equivocation in the authoritative statement; he distinguishes two or
more senses of the term or phrase in question; and he argues that although, if taken
in one way, the authoritative statement seems opposed to his position, taken in
another way it can be fully reconciled with his view.
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tween a speaker's understanding of the claims the speaker makes and an-
other understanding which the speaker did not fully grasp.
In his own writings Aquinas presupposes the same distinction between
a speaker's understanding and a fuller account. This distinction, I shall now
argue, was further justified and clarified by other views Aquinas held.
Externalism
According to Aquinas, general terms signify common natures, or quiddi-
ties51 through a ratio, or idea,52 which is an apprehension of the intelligible
structure of the essence, or quiddity.53 The definition of a term expresses
the quiddity.54 When someone fully apprehends a quiddity, he or she grasps
and is able to give its proper definition.
Aquinas recognizes, however, that it is possible and even common for
a subject to have an imperfect grasp of the quiddity signified by the terms
the subject uses. For instance, in his commentary on the Apostles' Creed,
Aquinas writes that "our understanding is so weak that no philosopher has
ever been able fully to discover by investigation the nature of a single fly;
and it is said that one philosopher spent thirty years in solitude that he
might understand the nature of a bee."55
When someone's understanding is imperfect, he does not fully grasp
the quiddity and his understanding is not expressed by a definition which
makes clear the essence (which we will call an essential definition). However,
he does have some grasp of the quiddity, and this understanding is ex-
pressed by a definition which refers to common, salient attributes (which
we will call a nominal definition). In the case of fire, for example, Aquinas
tells us that we can be ignorant of the substantial difference of its proper
definition, and must allow "hot, dry body"—a definition which employs
proper accidents—to stand in as the definition of "fire."56 And in another
place he writes, "Nevertheless because substantial forms, unknown to us of
themselves, are known through their accidents, there is no difficulty with
sometimes using accidents in place of substantial differences."57 In a nomi-
nal definition, the proper accidents are used as "effects of the substantial
forms, and as making these forms known [manifestant eas]."5S When the
51. ST 1.30.4.
52. ST 1.13.1.
53. Thomas Aquinas Expositio super librum Boethii de tήnitate 5.2; ST 1.85.1, ad 1
and 2.
54. ST 1.29.2.
55. Thomas Aquinas In symbolum apostolorum, prologus, 864, in Opuscula
theologica, vol. II (Rome: Marietti, 1954).
56. ST 1.29.1, ad3
57. ST 1.77.1, ad7.
58. ST 1.29.1, ad3.
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effects of a form are used in a nominal definition, there is some reference
to the form which is the cause; such definitions are implicitly or explicitly
reference-involving.59
Implicit in these and other passages is a view which has been dubbed
externalism in recent literature.60 The thought experiment which has been
used to motivate this doctrine, and which we can use to illustrate it, turns
on precisely the sort of partial or imperfect understanding of a concept
or nature which Aquinas discusses in the passages just cited.61 Imagine
the following: Catherine lives on earth and has a twin living in a world
extremely similar to earth.62 The only difference between the respective
worlds is that whereas on earth the liquid in oceans, lakes, and rivers is
H2O, in twin-Catherine's twin-earth the clear, colorless, tasteless liquid in
oceans, lakes, and rivers is indistinguishable from H2O to ordinary ob-
servation but is in fact a different compound (or element), which we will
call XYZ. Otherwise, the worlds are as similar as possible, and this simi-
larity extends to the respective internal states of Catherine and twin-Cath-
erine, which are taken to include bodily states, proximate sensory stimuli,
and behavioral dispositions.
Externalism is a doctrine which consists of two distinguishable but not
independent theses, the first of which is semantic externalism. In the twin
worlds described, both Catherine and twin-Catherine call the respective
liquids in lakes and oceans in their respective worlds 'water', their experi-
ences of the respective liquids is indistinguishable, and the nominal defini-
tion of each of the respective liquids is (let us say) 'a certain transparent,
colorless, tasteless liquid'. Still, 'water' means something different for each:
for Catherine it is H2O, and for twin-Catherine it is XYZ. The meaning of
'water', then, depends on the sort of liquid in the speaker's environment
and not solely on the speaker's internal states. Semantic externalism is the
59. For a fuller exposition of Aquinas's views on nominal definitions and for a
more detailed argument that Aquinas espoused what we call externalism below, see
my "Aquinas on the Veracity of the Intellect," The Journal of Philosophy, 88 (Novem-
ber 1991): 623-32, and "Good and the Object of Natural Inclinations in St. Thomas
Aquinas," Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 3 (1993): 62-96.
60. Among the most important articles are Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of
'Meaning'," in Mind, Language, and Reality (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1975); Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental," ed. P. French, T. Vehling, and
H. Wettstein, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 4 (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 1979), pp. 73-121; "Other Bodies," in Thought and Object, ed. Andrew
Woodfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 97-120; and "Intellectual
Norms and Foundations of Mind," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 697-720; Colin
McGinn, "The Structure of Content, " in Thought and Object, pp. 207-68; and Mental
Content (New York: Blackwell, 1989).
61. Tyler Burge, in a clear and illuminating discussion in "Individualism and
the Mental," argues that the possibility of imperfect understanding of a concept by
competent language users is what is key to externalist arguments.
62. These worlds may be imagined to be actual worlds in different parts of the
universe, or one or both may be thought to be merely possible.
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thesis that the meaning or signification of certain terms (though certainly
not all terms) of a speaker or linguistic community depend partially on the
speaker's or community's environment.
Semantic externalism implies a second externalist thesis, mental content
externalism. Since the meaning of 'water' for Catherine depends on the
nature of the liquid in her environment, the individuation of Catherine's
beliefs, desires, intentions, and other contentful mental states, which in-
clude the concept of water, also depend partially on her environment.
Catherine's belief that water is good to drink is a different belief from
twin-Catherine's belief that water is good to drink, for the former is a belief
about H2O and the latter about XYZ. Mental content externalism is the
thesis that the individuation of some (though not all) contentful mental
states of a subject depend partially on the subject's environment.63
It will be helpful for the ensuing discussion to introduce certain terms,
some of which do not have a clear correlate in Aquinas's writing. Neverthe-
less, though certain terms may not be found, the distinctions they help us
make are implicit there. When we assign a meaning to a certain speaker's
sentence, we implicitly attribute to the speaker the mastery of certain con-
cepts—or, to use more Thomistic language, we attribute the apprehension of
certain rationes. We can only suppose that Catherine meaningfully asserts that
water is good to drink, and is not simply uttering nonsensical sounds, if we
suppose that she is a competent English speaker who has grasped the con-
cepts of water, good, and dunking. In a case of imperfect understanding, the
speaker's grasp of a concept falls short of full apprehension but is sufficient
for competent use of the term in ordinary situations. Thus we must distin-
guish between the concept of, say, water, which is its full essence or ratio, and a
speaker's conception of water, which is her understanding of the concept
which is expressed in a nominal definition. Although it is somewhat of an
oversimplification, we will suppose that a speaker's conception is determined
strictly by conditions internal to the speaker and not by the environment. For
example, when Catherine understands water as 'a certain transparent, color-
less, tasteless liquid', her apprehension of these sensible predicates, unlike
that of the natural kind of water, does not depend on the external environ-
ment. The conception, then, gives us the subject's understanding, which
depends on internal factors of the subject individualistically considered and
not on external, environmental conditions.64
63. We do not here take up the question of the number and kinds of terms for
which externalism is true. Natural kind terms, such as 'water', are clear examples.
Elsewhere I have argued that for Aquinas, 'good' is an externalist term (see my
"Good and the Object of Natural Inclinations"). But many other terms, such as
terms for sensible forms, are not, I would argue, externally determined.
64. The oversimplification lies in supposing that a speaker's conception of an
externalist concept F is always internally determined. It may be that in some cases
a speaker's conception itself includes another externalist concept G. In this case,
however, we can replace that concept G by the speaker's conception of G and thus
identify the speaker's internal, individualistic understanding of the concept F.
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When a speaker utters a sentence which involves the mastery of con-
cepts of which her conception is only partial, the meaning of her sentence
is externally determined. Thus, we can distinguish two components of meaning.
first, there is the speaker's understanding, constituted by her conceptions;
second, there is the full meaning, constituted by the concepts involved.
Similarly, in ascribing a propositional attitude, such as a thought or desire,
we can distinguish two components of mental content there is the subject's
understanding of the content, determined by her conceptions; and there is
the full understanding, determined by the concepts.65
Most relevant to our present concerns are the implications of these
externalist doctrines for interpretation. Given the dual-component ac-
count of meaning and mental content, interpretation becomes a twofold
task. If I am fully to understand Catherine's thoughts and claims about
water, then I must not only consider her conceptions; I must also consider
the concepts, the natures of the things in her environment, as I can best
determine these. Full interpretation, then, requires not only that I attempt
to clarify what is in Catherine's head, as it were, but also that I construct
the best theory I can about what is in her environment. In this account,
interpretation brings the effort to discern what a subject is thinking or
saying together with the effort to construct an adequate theory of the
natures or essences about which he or she is thinking or talking. And in
the latter effort it may be that I will arrive at an account which is superior
to the subject's understanding, and thus I may be said to know what he
or she is talking and thinking about better than he or she does. For
example, if I can distinguish H2O from XYZ, I can make distinctions re-
garding the thoughts and claims of the two Catherines which they them-
selves were unable to make.
The implications of Aquinas's externalism for his interpretation of
Aristotle are perhaps apparent. Since Aquinas was an externalist with re-
spect to semantics and mental content, he held that interpreting Aris-
totle's thoughts and words required not only that he elucidate Aristotle's
understanding, as this is individualistically considered, but also that he
bring in the best available account, as he could determine this by his
own lights, of the issues which Aristotle discussed. Thus we see how for
Aquinas the exegetical concern to make clear what was in Aristotle's head
was joined with the effort to construct an adequate theory of the matters
which Aristotle discussed. We have, then, the beginning of a rationale
for the presence of constructive as well as exegetical elements in the Ar-
istotelian commentaries. However, more needs to be said about Aquinas's
strategies in these works, and in the next section I will show how our
claims enable us to deal with the problematic passages discussed in sec-
tion I.
65. For this term and for a clear discussion of a dual-component account of
content, I am indebted to McGinn, "Structure of Content."
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III
The sort of interpretation one gives of the sentences of a given speaker
depends on one's purposes in the particular context. Full interpretation, as
defined by dual-component accounts of meaning and mental content,
could only serve as a distant ideal of interpretation and not as a practical
goal of Aquinas's commentaries. Elucidation of all the essential definitions
and concepts involved would require final knowledge of Aristotle's sciences,
the completion of all inquiry in these areas. In the commentaries, Aquinas
was not interested in ending inquiry, but on the contrary, he wanted to
introduce his readers to Aristotle so that they could fruitfully employ this
authority in their own inquiries. In this effort, I contend, his strategy was to
teach his readers about Aristotle's own individualistic understanding—the
first component of meaning and mental content—of the issues discussed.
Yet he also wanted to suggest or show the ways in which Aristotle's words are
open to, and can be incorporated in, a fuller and more adequate under-
standing—the second component of meaning and content. A full account
of key concepts is the work of further inquiries, and we should not expect
Aquinas to give it here. Still, he was interested in showing how Aristotle's
words may be open to this full account which may be further clarified in the
inquiries of teachers and students. I shall now attempt to use the principles
identified to make sense of the problematic passages discussed above.
Nicomachean Ethics 10.7 and 8
In Summa theologίae 2-1.3.6, Aquinas asks "whether beatitude consists in
consideration of the speculative sciences." Aquinas's Christian view is that
human beatitude consists in the full vision of God's essence in heaven, but
he must contend with Aristotle's position, cited in the first objection of this
article, that human beatitude consists in activity according to virtue, and
among these are the intellectual virtues of science, wisdom, and under-
standing, which pertain to consideration of the speculative sciences.
Aquinas responds that "the Philosopher speaks in the book of the Ethics
about imperfect felicity, and about how it can be attained in this life."66 This
imperfect beatitude is "a certain participation in the true and perfect
beatitude,"6 7 and thus Aristotle's understanding of beatitude is not incom-
patible with Aquinas's Christian understanding. But, of course, we do not
find the imperfect-perfect beatitude distinction clearly expressed in Aris-
totle's texts. Aristotle recognizes that human beatitude in this life is imper-
fect in several ways,68 but he does not speak straightforwardly about a
66. ST 1-1.3.6. ad 1.
67. ST 1-2.3.6.
68. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1.11, 1101a20-21.
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perfect beatitude in an afterlife.69 Aquinas can make such a distinction with
respect to Aristotle's text, and thus reconcile Aristotle's claims to his own,
only by attributing a sense to "human beatitude" which Aristotle did not, or
at least did not clearly, recognize.
When Aquinas comments on Aristotle's discussion of beatitude and
contemplation in the tenth book of the Ethics, he makes clear, as best he can,
Aristotle's own individualistic understanding of the key concepts beatitude,
separate, and divine. However, he also suggests to the reader ways in which
Aristotle's words are open to an understanding which Aristotle did not
clearly express or even fully recognize. His comments indicate to his audi-
ence the ways in which a fuller understanding of Aristotle's key concepts is
possible, given their metaphysical and religious convictions, and thus shows
them how to incorporate Aristotle's claims in their own inquiries.
Metaphysics 12.9
In the key passage in Aquinas's gloss (which is quoted above), Aquinas tells
us what Aristotle claims ("The Philosopher intends to show . . .") and then
goes on to tell us what does and does not follow from his claim ("It is evident
that . . . " ) . It is left unclear whether or not Aquinas thought that Aristotle
understood the consequences of his claim. Given Aquinas's hermeneutical
principles, however, whether or not Aristotle understood these conse-
quences, they are still implied by the text. Aristotle had an understanding
of the concept of God and of divine activity, and he did see that this divine
activity consists in a thinking on thinking. Whether or not his under-
standing was limited to this, the full grasp of the concept of divine activity
would include an apprehension that in thinking on Himself, God knows all
other things. Thus the full meaning of Aristotle's claim that God's activity
is a thinking on thinking implies that God knows other things, whether or
not the speaker's individualistic understanding includes this implication.
Aquinas here does not show great concern with determining the
speaker's meaning because, first, the evidence is insufficient. Although
Aristotle does not explicitly assert the consequence, we cannot definitively
rule out his recognition of it. Second, this determination is not critical for
Aquinas's purposes in the commentary. Aquinas's concern is to help others
read Aristotle so that Aristotle's texts can contribute to their inquiries. For
this, it is more important that Aquinas show the truth Aristotle's words
signify rather than determine precisely what Aristotle's understanding
was.70
69. Aquinas draws this conclusion for him (In ethica 1.16.202), but he does not
clearly assert it.
70. See In de caelo 1.22.228.
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Metaphysics 2.1
This passage is the most difficult to account for, for Aquinas attributes to
Aristotle the doctrine of a cause of being on the basis of one passage alone,
though Aristotle does not introduce this notion anywhere else. And, Aqui-
nas gives no indication that this is an account of the full meaning and is
distinct from that of the speaker's understanding. Indeed, he claims that
Aristotle "expressly says" that the First Mover is the cause of the being, and
not just the motion, of other things.
It may be that the polemical, anti-Aristotelian context of Paris in the
early 1270s led Aquinas to give a tendentious reading of this passage. Still,
given his hermeneutical principles, his reading is defensible.
Aquinas believed that the discovery of causes was gradual among the
ancient philosophers. The earliest considered only the causes of accidental
changes and for them all becoming was alteration. Subsequently, natural
philosophers came to understand substantial change. Finally, Plato and
Aristotle discovered the causality of the principle of all being.71 In another
work, Aquinas says that Plato did not fully grasp the notion of a creation ex
nihilo, for his first principle made the world from preexisting matter.72
Aristotle did discover the notion of creation ex nihilo, but only vaguely. He
mistakenly thought that God's creation was from eternity. And although
this sort of causality could not be what he calls a motio, it is left to Aquinas
to label it an eminatio and to describe it.73
It seems, then, that Aristotle might have hit on the notion of a cause of
being, but he understood it only vaguely and "with an admixture of many
errors."
74
 If we are right that Aquinas embraced a dual-component account
of meaning, this is understandable. On this account, a speaker may be said
to have acquired the concept of F, even though his or her understanding of
F is severely limited, for the speaker's concepts and the meaning of his or
her words is not fixed by his or her understanding alone but by the nature
or essence understood. Such a claim seems to be behind the belief that it
was Joseph Priestly rather than Lavoisier who is credited with the discovery
of oxygen, even though Priestly understood "pure air" in terms of a false
phlogiston theory, dubbed it "dephlogistonated air," and had a very mini-
mal understanding of its properties.75 Similarly, Aquinas might claim, Aris-
71. Inphysica 8.2.975.
72. Thomas Aquinas De articulis fidei et ecclessiae sacramentis ad archiepiscopum
Paniσrmitanum, in Leonine Edition of Opera Omnia 42, p. 246.
73. Inphysica8.2.988.
74. ST 1.1.1.
75. Antoine Lavoisier, of course, was the one who separated this newly identi-
fied gas from phlogiston theory and gave it the name pήncipe oxigine, which he later
shortened to oxygene. Although he claimed to have discovered oxygen, his claim is
not recognized. SeeJ. R. Partington, A Short History of Chemistry (London: Macmil-
lan, 1957), p. 129.
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totle grasped the notion of a cause of being in the brief passage in Metaphys-
ics 2.1, even though his understanding of it was vague and in many ways
mistaken. Nevertheless, Aquinas's principles of interpretation help us to
understand his attribution of this understanding to Aristotle.
IV
In the epigraph, Aquinas states that in his commentary on the Peήhermeneias
he tried to provide an exposition of Aristotle's difficult text which would be
useful both to the more and to the less advanced. In their attempt to
understand these commentaries, appropriationists and historicists both
seem to accept an exclusive disjunction: either Aquinas was giving us his
own views on ethics, physics, metaphysics, and so on, or, prescinding from
judgment, he was simply trying to understand Aristotle's thoughts on these
matters. Since both sides can point to passages in which Aquinas is clearly
doing one or the other, both can use this disjunction to marshal an argu-
ment for their position. Here, I have argued that the common premise of
these two camps is mistaken. Aquinas's dialectical approach to authorities
and his externalism led him to hermeneutical principles which required
that in order to elucidate Aristotle's texts, he must both make clear Aris-
totle's individualistic understanding and construct, or at least suggest, the
best account of the matter under discussion. In this way, Aquinas thought,
he could provide expositions of Aristotle's texts which would be most useful
for his readers' dialectical inquiries.
Although Aquinas adapted and refined Aristotle's procedures, he was,
in commenting on Aristotle, following Aristotle's example. In his gloss on
Aristotle's discussion of the teachings of Anaxagoras, Aquinas explains that
Anaxagoras's more subtle doctrine can be found "if. . . one seeks diligently
[to state] clearly and manifestly what Anaxagoras 'wishes to say', i.e., what
his intellect tended toward, but he was unable to express."76 Similarly, in the
commentaries Aquinas often sought to be true to Aristotle's text by present-
ing not only what Aristotle understood but also what his intellect "tended
toward," as Aquinas understood this by his own best lights. And Aquinas's
best lights included both what he took as the insights of his own metaphysics
as well as what he knew by the light of Christian faith.
If my major thesis is correct, there are implications for the pivotal
question of the relationship of Aquinas's thought to Aristotle. Whereas
appropriationists believe they can find in Aquinas's writings strictly philo-
sophical doctrines which can in turn be identified with Aristotle's, histori-
cists tend to draw a more or less sharp distinction between the thought of
Aquinas and that of Aristotle. Jordan, for instance, recently remarked, "How
76. In meta. 1.12.196.
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unhappy it is . . . in how many ways, to allege that Thomas himself is a
philosopher of something called 'Aristotelianism.'"'7'7 But if we have cor-
rectly identified Aquinas's hermeneutical principles, "Aristotelianism" be-
comes more flexible, and Aquinas could have both recognized the
limitations of Aristotle's teachings and still have considered himself to have
incorporated them in his own, and thus to be an Aristotelian. But this is a
topic for another time.
77. Jordan, Alleged Aήstotelianism of Thomas Aquinas, p. 41.
